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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS 
ON POVERTY LAW FIRMS: A NEW YORK 
CASE STUDY 
MICHAEL BOTEIN* 
Government-funded poverty law firms are presently providitzg 
essential legal services to poor people throughout the country. 
These firms have met with varying responses from the bar and the 
courts. In this article, Professor Botein examines the response of 
New York's Appellate Division, First Department-a comprehensive 
set of regulations governing the practice of law by poverty law 
firms. After analyzing these regulations and the constitutional issues 
they raise, the author concludes that both procedurally and sub-
stantively there is strong doubt concerning their validity. 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
THOUGH few Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) pro-jects have won accolades from local powers-that-be, Legal 
Services probably has the distinction of being the most unpopu-
lar program around. From its inception, it has been under at-
tack from local legal establishments,! and more recently the 
Nixon Administration singled it out as the first OEO program 
to be emasculated.2 General questions of federal-state relations 
do, of course, figure into this formula for disaster,3 but the prime 
lesson of the Legal Services experience may simply be that 
poverty lawyers are remarkably effective at attacking previously 
sacrosanct local interests. The heat generated by Legal Services 
is therefore a tribute to the power of the profession. Unfor-
tunately, the bar's response has not been a gracious acceptance 
of Legal Services, but rather an attempt to straitjacket it. 
The New York City experience with Legal Services has 
been noteworthy-first, because of the city's size and visibility, 
and second, because of OEO's huge investment in New York. 
Nearly 10% of the total Legal Services budget finds its way 
* Ford Urban Law Fellow, Columbia Law School Assistant Professor of 
Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1966, Wesleyan University. J.D., 1969, Cornell 
Law School. 
1 Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for 
the Poor, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 805, 833-34, 843-44 (1967) [hereinafter Harvard 
Note]. See Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), where several 
local bar associations sought an injunction against a Legal Services office but 
were held to lack standing. 
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1970, at 21, col. 4. 
3 See, e.g., Nat'! Institute on Fed. Urban Grants: Policies and Procedures, 
22 Ad. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1969). 
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into the city.4 The Appellate Division, First Department has 
reacted to this massive federal commitment by imposing a 
variety of restrictions on poverty law firms. An analysis of these 
restrictions and their constitutionality may anticipate similar 
developments in other jurisdictions. 
II 
THE' NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 
A. Background to Appellate Division Regulation 
Poverty law firms must receive Appellate Division approval 
in order to practice law in New York.5 In 1966, Community 
Action for Legal Services (CALS) petitioned the Appellate 
Division, First Department, for such approval.6 In Matter of 
Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., (CALS), the court's 
initial reaction was totally negative.7 The court rejected CALS' 
petition and indicated by way of dictum its opposition to most 
of the proposed innovations, i.e., solicitation,s group representa-
tionll and lobbying.10 Though CALS' application was ultimately 
approved after extensive modification,l1 the court continued its 
4 Office of Economic Opportunity, Evaluation, Community Action For 
Legal Services, Inc. 6 (1970) [hereinafter CALS Report]. 
li N.Y. Judiciary Law § 495 (McKinney 1968) bans the practice of law by 
corporations and voluntary associations. An exception is made, however, for 
"organizations organized for benevolent or charitable purposes, or for the pur-
pose of assisting persons without means in the pursuit of any civil remedy, 
whose existence, organization or incorporation may be approved by the Appel-
late Division." 
6 The application was made to the First Department because the principal 
offices of the proposed corporations were to be located in that Department. 
Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 356 
n.2, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 n.2 (lst Dep't 1966). Two other petitioners joined 
with CALS in the action. They were the New York Legal Assistance Corpora-
tion and Harlem Assertion of Rights, Inc. 
7 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (lst Dep't 1966). 
sId. at 362-63, 274 N.y.s.2d at 789. 
Il Id. at 363. 
10 Id. at 362, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 788: "[A]II the proposals are deficient ••• 
in not prohibiting entirely and without evasive qualification political, lobbying, 
and propagandistic activity." 
11 Order, Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc. (App. Div. 
lst Dep't, Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter CALS Order]. The provisions of the order 
were, in several significant aspects, less restrictive than the rules later pro-
mulgated. Thus, the rules prescribe extensive procedures concerning application 
for and renewal of court approval of the legal corporation's operations (N.Y. 
Ct. Rules, App. Div., lst Dep't, Part 608, §§ 608.2, .3 (McKinney 1970) [herein-
after Part 608]) and require extensive annual reports (id. § 608.S)-topics dealt 
with only generally in the CALS Order. In addition, the rules add strong curbs on 
the dissemination of information (id. § 60S.7(e» and on referrals (id. § 60S.7 
(f) ), and dispense with the prerevocation hearing requirement of the CALS 
Order (id. § 608.9). The rules are, however, no more stringent than the order, 
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regulation by informal means. In what has become known as 
.the "Stevens Letter," Presiding Justice Harold A. Stevens made 
the court's position still clearer by advising CALS not to sacri" 
fice service to individual clients upon the alter of law reform.I :! 
In both its initial CALS decision and in later actions the 
Appellate Division has reflected an apparent apprehension that 
local politicians would take over poverty law firms and run them 
with little regard for either efficiency or ethics. Recent history 
has, in fact, partially borne these predictions OUt.13 The court's 
concern has led it, however, to paint over these legitimate evils 
with a brush far broader than necessary and in a possibly un" 
constitutional manner. 
In 1970, the Appellate Division promulgated a comprehen" 
sive set of regulations governing the practice of law by poverty 
law firms.14 The rules represent, in a sense, an expansion and 
codification of the court's dictum in CALS!!) in that they severely 
limit poverty lawyers' rights regarding solicitation, group repre" 
sentation, referrals and lobbying. 
A variety of poverty law firms and clients soon challenged 
the constitutionality of the rules in Young Lords v. Supreme 
Court.16 The three-judge district court that heard the case 
refused to pass on the rules' constitutionality, deeming it a "wise 
exercise of discretion" to allow the Appellate Division to con" 
fer with the plaintiff law firmsP While the court retained 
for example, in restricting civil protest and political activity (id. § 608.8(c», 
limiting representation of organizations and groups rather than individuals (id. § 
608.8(b», and defining the membership of boards of directors (id. § 608.6). 
The rules may even be more liberal in some areas, such as in the use of law 
students as legal counsellors. 
12 Letter from Presiding Justice Harold A. Stevens to Community Action 
for Legal Services, Inc., Oct. 2, 1969 [hereinafter Stevens Letter] (on file at the 
New York University Law Review offices). Though Presiding Justice Stevens ap-
peared to speak as an individual, his letter began by noting that he was writing 
"[u]pon direction of the court." Id. at 1. 
13 An OED evaluation team found in 1970 that some Legal Services offices 
had become dominated by local politicians and had been transformed into sources 
of patronage. See CALS Report, supra note 4, at 80. 
14 Part 608, supra note 11. While affecting all poverty law offices, the rules 
influence most strongly Legal Services offices, since these offices handle the bulk 
of all civil poverty law practice in New York City. The rules also apply to 
other groups organized "for benevolent or charitable purposes." Id. 
15 See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra. 
16 Civil No. 70-5179 (S.D.N.Y., May 19, 1971). The primary assertions of 
the complaint were that the rules denied free speech, free association and equal 
protection of the laws. Id. at 4. 
17 Id. at 7. The court indicated that "[w]e do not reach these arguments 
because counsel for defendants has represented that at least partial, and perhaps 
full, resolution of the controversy may be accomplished if plaintiff Legal Rights 
Organizations apply • . • for approval under Part 608 and for such exceptions 
for their activities as they believe are necessary." Id. at 5. 
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jurisdiction, it will likely never reach the merits, but rather 
will probably follow its current practice of leaving challenges 
to the Appellate Division to be resolved informally.18 
Running throughout the web of Appellate Division activity 
is a distinct thread of participation by the private bar. The 
Stevens Letter referred to recommendations by the City Bar 
Association's Committee on Professional Responsibility19 and 
advised CALS that it could get "more detail" regarding Appel-
late Division requirements in that committee's report.20 In ad-
dition, the rules were formulated in consultation with the Bar 
Association's committeej21 they require poverty law firms to 
serve copies of their applications on the Associationj 22 and they 
are administered with the help of the committee.23 Finally, 
counsel for the Appellate Division in Young Lords was one of 
the Association members who is responsible for assisting in the 
administration of the rules.24 
B. Procedural Infirmities of the Rules 
Though it might answer some of the federal constitutional 
questions surrounding the rules, a decision in Young Lords 
would not resolve several collateral procedural points. First, the 
Appellate Division's very power to promulgate the rules may be 
an unlawful delegation of power. Although the delegation doc-
trine is now hopefully a dead letter of the law on the federal 
level,2u it is still alive and well in the New York courts. The 
Appellate Division's enabling legislation26 contains no standards 
at all, not even a ritualistic invocation of the "public interest.'127 
And, though the New York courts sometimes appear to be 
satisfied with ritua1,28 they have been especially sensitive to a 
18 Cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 
F. Supp. 117 (S.DN.Y. 1969), aff'd, 401 U.S. 154 (1971). 
10 Stevens Letter, supra note 12, at 1. 
20 Id. at 3. 
21 See 25 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 466 (1970). 
22 Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.2 (copies must also be served on the New 
York County Lawyers' Ass'n and the Bronx County Bar Ass'n, inter alia). 
23 See 25 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 466 (1970). 
2·1 Young Lords v. Supreme Court, Civil No. 70-5179 (S.DN.Y., May 19, 
1971). 
2[; 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.01 (1958); W. Gellhom & 
C. Byse, Administrative Law: Cases and Co=ents 60-61 (5th ed. 1970); L. 
Jaffe & N. Nathanson, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 80-81 (3d ed. 
1968). 
211 N.Y. Judiciary Law § 495(5) (McKinney 1968). 
21 See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.03, at 81-82 (1958). 
28 See, e.g., Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 App. Div. 2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510 
(1st Dep't 1968) (standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity" was 
not so indefinite as to confer unlimited authority). 
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lack of standards where, as here, licenses29 or constitutional 
rightsSO have been at stake.S1 Moreover, the First Department 
has been disturbed by private participation in the administrative 
process,S2 a factor whiCh, as noted above, is present in its own 
regulation of poverty law firms. 
Second, the adoption and administration of the rules may 
violate the due process right to notice and a hearing. While the 
promulgation of the rules was superficially a quasi-legislative act 
requiring no due process safeguards,38 the rules affect only a 
29 Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of N.Y., 298 N.Y. 
184, 81 N.E.2d 80 (1948); Seignious v. Rice, 273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E.2d 91 (1936). 
30 Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of N.Y., 298 N.Y. 
184, 191-92, 81 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1948). The constitutional rights involved in the 
instant situation are more compelling than the somewhat tenuous substantive 
due process right to attend private schools which the Packer court derived from 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
31 The New York courts have, however, recognized that a seemingly vague 
standard may, through custom and practice, acquire a definite meaning. Cherry 
v. Board of Regents, 289 N.Y. 148, 44 N.E.2d 405 (1942) ("unprofessional 
conduct"); Mandel v. Board of Regents, 250 N.Y. 173, 164 N.E. 895 (1928) 
("unfit or incompetent from negligence, habits or other cause" to practice the 
profession). The Supreme Court itself has held that "[l]ong usage in New York 
and elsewhere has given well-defined contours" to New York's requirement of 
good character and fitness for admission to the bar. Law Students Civil Rights 
Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971). But cf. Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1957). Although the courts m.ight thus 
be willing to read meaning into a similarly vague standard, the statute at issue 
here lacks even this vestige of judicially construable language. 
It m.ight also be argued that the provisions of the regulations could be read 
by implication into the statute, thus following another time-honored judicial 
method of finding standards. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 
(1948). The only problem with this approach is that the regulations themselves 
set no standards. While it m.ight be possible to read standards into the regula-
tions by construing the provisions in Part 608, supra note 11, §§ 608-2,-.7,-.8 
(relating to reporting requirements and restrictions imposed upon the actions of 
poverty law firms), as initial licensing standards, this thrice-removed canon of 
construction would presumably be too extreme for even the most sympathetic court. 
32 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 34 App. Div. 2d 79, 309 N.y.s.2d 443 (1st 
Dep't), rev'd, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 261 N.E.2d 647, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1970). Though 
the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, it did recognize that any 
significant delegation of adm.inistrative power to private parties was invalid. 
33 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.07, at 436 (1958). In Young 
Lords v. Supreme Court, Civil No. 70-5179 at 5 (S.D.N.Y., May 19, 1971), 
the court said that in promulgating the rules the Appellate Division had been 
acting "in a legislative or, as it is now usually phrased, in an administrative 
capacity." The court, however, neither raised nor reached the issue of the right 
to a hearing. It was concerned solely with whether the rules could be appealed 
directly to the New York Court of Appeals. In Law Students Civil Rights 
Research Council, Inc. v. WadInond, 401 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1971), however, the 
Supreme Court refused to express an opinion as to whether in controlling ad-
mission to the bar the Appellate Divisions acted as "courts" or "administrative 
agencies." In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1866), the Court 
stated that admission to the bar "is not the exercise of a ministerial power. It is 
the exercise of judicial power." 
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small number of poverty law firms and presumably were aimed 
only at them.34 Therefore, in fact if not in form,35 the promul-
gation of the rules may have been an adjudication, thus requir-
ing both notice and a hearing.s6 
Furthermore, the rules themselves provide for little or no 
procedural due process upon application for or revocation of 
the Appellate Division's approval.37 Due process requires full 
notice and a hearing prior to the denial of admission to the 
bar,3B and there seems to be no reason to treat a poverty law 
firm's right to practice differently. In addition, the New York 
courts have been very strict in the analogous area of licensing. 
The Court of Appeals has held, for instance, that a driver's 
license may not be revoked without a hearing; 39 presumably, 
34 The original CALS decision was apparently adjudicatory in nature and 
involved the applications of only three groups. Although an agency is, of course, 
free to change from adjudication to rulemaking and indeed may be encouraged 
to do so, SEC v. ChenerY Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the original mode of 
regulation is certainly relevant in characterizing later modes of regulation. 
35 Some courts are willing to look beyond form. In American Export-
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 389 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), for e.~ple, the court held that an order which invalidated provi-
sions in a large number of longshoremen's contracts amounted to an adjudication. 
See also Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948), vacated, 337 
U.S. 901 ·(1949). Though the reasoning of these two cases seems sound, it has not 
been followed by other courts and has been criticized. See 1 K. Davis, Administra-
tive Law Treatise § 7.01, at 409-10 (1958). 
36 In commenting upon the Appellate Division rules, a committee of the 
New York County Lawyers Association noted that, "it would have been desir-
able for the Appellate Division to have given some form of notice of proposed 
rule-making, either formal or informal • • • in advance of the issuance of Part 
608." Memorandum from Comm. on Legal Aid to Bd. of Directors, New York 
County Lawyers Ass'n at 5 (Jan. 8, 1971) [hereinafter County Lawyers Report] 
(on file at the New York University Law Review offices). 
37 Part 608 makes no provision at all for notice and a hearing upon applica-
tion for approval. Two different provisions are applicable to revocation of ap-
proval. Part 608, supra note 11, at § 608.4(b), allows revocation for the violation 
of any of the conditions and limitations in the Appellate Division's order of 
approval "on such notice and after such hearing as the Appellate Division may 
deem appropriate." Procedural niceties are thus apparently left entirely up to 
the Appellate Division's whim. Section 608.9, on the other hand, provides for 
revocation for any other reasons "[u]pon good cause shown ••• on not less 
than twenty days' notice," but has no provision for a hearing. 
38 Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 108 (1963) 
(concurring opinion); Goldsmith v. Board of Ta.~ Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 
(1926). In Willner the Court made the perhaps overly optimistic assumption 
that "[c]ertainIy lawyers and courts should be particularly sensitive of, and 
have a special obligation to respect, the demands of due process." 373 U.S. at 
106. 
30 Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952). 
See also People v. Faxlanger, 1 N.Y.2d 393, 135 N.E.2d 70S, 153 N.Y.S.2d 193 
(1956) (license to operate gasoline station); English v. Tofany, 32 App. Div. 
2d 878, 302 N.Y.S.2d 221 (4th Dep't 1969); Scuiletti v. Sheridan, 12 App. Div. 
2d 801, 210 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1961) (taxi license). 
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the courts should protect poverty law firms as thoroughly as 
automobile drivers. 
Thus, the regulations suffer from a variety of procedural 
defects. More importantly, however, they impose severe sub· 
stantive restrictions upon essential poverty law activities-
restrictions which may, unfortunately, be emulated by other 
jurisdictions. 
III 
EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A. Solicitation 
The Appellate Division rules severely limit the range of 
permissible solicitation by allowing a poverty law firm to dis· 
tribute only information which concerns the nature of its ser· 
vices and states its economic eligibility requirements.4!) 
These rules strike at the lifeblood of any law firm-its 
clients. They are especially harsh in light of poor people's igno. 
rance of the law and of their need for lawyers. While the middle 
class may have some notion of when to consult an attorney, the 
poor generally do not.41 In addition, the poor, unlike the middle 
class, have little social contact with lawyers. Aggressive educa-
tion and advertising are therefore necessary in order to make 
an impact in their communities.42 
In NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court recognized this 
need and cloaked solicitation with first amendment protection.43 
In Button, the NAACP organized meetings at which attorneys 
encouraged black people to bring desegregation lawsuits. They 
also tried to induce participants to become plaintiffs for par· 
ticular actions.44 In holding the NAACP's activities to be con-
40 Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(e), provides: 
[A group] formed solely for the purpose of rendering or furnishing legal 
services to persons without means, may publish and! or distribute and! or 
disseminate information of the nature of the services it is authorized to 
render, with an inclusion, however, of a statement of the eligibility and 
general qualifications of persons to receive such services. 
This subsection is somewhat vague, since it is unclear whether: (1) the 
firm must serve only poor people; (2) all clients solicited must be poor; or (3) 
both criteria must be met. The language of the provision was, in fact, apparently 
added as an afterthought. By comparison, the original CALS Order specifically 
gave CALS the power "to inform the public, and in particular the poor of legal 
problems, the availability of legal counsel and the basic legal rights of all citi-
zens." CALS Order, supra note 11, at 3. 
41 Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State Bar, 377 
U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
42 Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 821-22. 
43 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963). 
« Id. at 421-22. 
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stitutionally protected, the Court sanctioned solicitation far 
stronger than that preached or planned by any poverty law 
firm.~G In two later cases, the Court went even further and per-
mitted direct personal approaches to potential litigants46-a 
technique beyond even the most ambitious community education 
project. 
In fact, solicitation by a poverty law firm poses far fewer 
dangers than the activities involved in Button and later cases. 
Since poverty lawyers usually receive a fixed salary, they have 
no economic incentive to foment litigation. Moreover, a conflict 
between an organization's goals and a client's interests is far 
less likely in a poverty law firm than in a case like Button, since 
a poverty lawyer is associated with an independent law firm, not 
with the organization bringing suit. 
Furthermore, restrictions on solicitation are inconsistent 
with the current development of professional ethics. The pro-
hibition on advertising originally evolved not as an ethical 
principle, but rather as part of the "rules of professional eti-
quette.,,47 As such, the prohibition has a rather tenuous founda-
tion today, especially when applied to the provision of legal 
services to the poor, as both bar and bench have recognized. On 
a national level, the American Bar Association has traditionally 
sanctioned any advertising necessary to help the poor or vindi-
cate constitutional rights.48 Moreover, OEO encourages solicita-
~G rd. at 428-29. The Court may have actually meant to protect a narrow 
range of activities since it read the Virginia court's decree as prohibiting "any 
arrangement by which prospective litigants are advised to seek the assistance of 
particular attorneys." rd. at 433 (emphasis added). This reading of the case is, 
however, belied by the Court's later more expansive holdings. See note 46 infra. 
46 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 578 (1971) (union 
representatives transported potential claimants to the offices of attorneys chosen 
by the union); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State 
Bar, 377 U.S. I, 4 (1964) (union representatives visited injured workers and 
urged them to retain particular attorneys to prosecute their claims). These 
two cases, and United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 
U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967), clearly demonstrate that Button cannot be distinguished 
as a "civil rights" or "speech" case. "The common thread running through our 
decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United .Mine Workers is that 
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a 
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." United 
Transp. Union v. State Bar of :Mich., supra at 585. To a certain e.,tent the Court 
may have been combining first amendment protection with its recent develop-
ment of a due process and equal protection right of access to the courts. See note 
106 infra. 
47 H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 211 n.3, 212 (1953). 
48 The ABA has allowed newspaper and radio advertisements designed to 
inform poor people of their rights and encourage them to seek legal assistance. 
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 148 (1935); Informal Opin-
ions, No. 992 (1967), No. 786 (1964), No. 764 (1964). See also Fla. Comm, 
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tion by Legal Services offices.49 On a local level, the New York 
State Bar Association has approved direct mail solicitation of 
defendants in eviction proceedings.50 In addition, the courts 
have always followed the bar's lead in recognizing the special 
needs of poor people with regard to solicitation.51 
Thus, broad prohibitions on solicitation by poverty law 
firms are probably unconstitutional and certainly not ethically 
mandated. Although the possibility that poor people will be 
forced into unwanted litigation is a real problem, it can be 
resolved by narrowly drawn limitations. Such restrictions, how-
ever, must be grounded upon the protection of poor people--not 
upon some hypothetical interest of the bar or of the middle 
class.52 
on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 66-56 (1967), 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 
6100.15, at 7153 (1971); Padnos, Legal Aid and Legal Ethics,S Ga. S.B.J. 347 
(1969). In addition, the ABA's new Code of Professional Responsibility codifies 
the bar's historical commitment by expressly exempting poverty law firms from 
its general ban on solicitation. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility D-R 
2-103(D) (1969). In fact, the drafters of the code seem to have attempted to 
incorporate constitutional standards by reference, since D-R 2-103 (D) (5) n.123 
explicitly refers to NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Brotherhood of RR 
Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), and United Mine 
Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
49 Office of Economic Opportunity, How to Apply For a Legal Services 
Program, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. II 6705.50, at 7730-32 (1968). See also Note, 
Beyond the Neighborhood Offices-OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services, 56 
Geo. L.J. 742, 750 (1968). The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, 
another organization with experience and expertise in poverty law, also en-
courages extensive co=unity education. NLADA, Handbook of Standards for 
Legal Aid and Defender Offices 14 (1970). OEO's encouragement of solicitation 
also raises questions of preemption. See text accompanying notes 108-116 infra. 
50 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 75 
(1968),23 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 374 (1968). See also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Co=. 
on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 71 (1968), in which the committee authorized 
distribution of pamphlets which portrayed aspects of the law important to the 
poor. 
Most recently and dramatically, the District of Columbia Bar Association 
approved full-page newspaper advertisements in which the Stem Community 
Law Firm, a private "public interest" organization, listed toys which the Food 
and Drug Administration had found to be defective and urged consumers to 
assert their right to return the toys. The advertisement suggested that consumers 
contact the law firm if their dealer refused a refund. D.C. Co=. on Legal Ethics 
and Grievance, Report (1971) (on file at the New York University Law Review 
offices) . 
51 See, e.g., In Re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); Stanislaus County 
Bar Ass'n v. California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 
6100.05, at 7152 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1967); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 19l Ga. 
366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940); Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 432 S.W.2d 
690 (Tex. 1968). In fact, even the Virginia court reversed by Button held that 
solicitation was entitled to some, albeit limited, first amendment protection. 
NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960). 
52 See note 118 infra. 
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B. Group Representation 
Group representation is an essential poverty law too1.53 It 
is not only an effective means of making contact with the com-
munity, but is also the only feasible way to secure relief in many 
situations, e.g., a rent strike. In addition, poverty law firms' 
limited resources often make individual representation merely 
a gesture and group representation a necessity in order to mean-
ingfully help the community.54 
The Appellate Division's rules on group representation 
seem to have been motivated largely by a fear that poverty law 
firms would take cases with controversial political, social and 
economic issues.m; The rules begin with an outright ban on group 
representation,u6 but make an exception for "legal services ren-
dered to groups or organizations of persons primarily for the 
purpose of promoting the interests of persons eligible as indigent 
individuals."u7 This proviso is obviously somewhat ambiguous, 
but it appears to allow a firm to represent only groups whose 
membership is primarily indigent. 
Such a limitation encroaches upon the constitutional right of 
association.us This right, upheld in Button as regards the 
NAACP, applies equally as well to groups which seek represen-
tation by a poverty law firm. Freedom of association would be 
meaningless in many cases if groups were denied such represen-
tation. First, an organization often needs an attorney to effec-
tuate its beliefs and goals; second, lack of money or espousal 
of unpopular causes will often deprive such groups of any coun-
sel other than poverty lawyers. The right to such representation 
is not limited to the indigent. In Button and in two later 
cases involving unionized workers,59 the Supreme Court specifi-
53 See Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 817-18. 
54 See CALS Report, supra note 4, at 20. 
55 In Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 
2d 354, 363, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 789 (1st Dep't 1966), the court noted that "mt 
would be one thing to allow neighborhood law offices to handle poor men's 
credit unions. It would be quite another to have them handle, advise, and 
represent political factions or organizations of social and economic protest, how-
ever worthy." 
56 "Except as may be specifically authorized by order of the Appellate 
Division, no corporation, association or organization shall be entitled to procure 
or furnish legal services to another corporation, association or organization." 
Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(b). 
57Id. 
58 "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of belieis and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." NAACP v. Alabama 
ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
50 See note 46 supra. 
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cally allowed representation of nonindigent individuals. The 
rules' limitation on group representation therefore amounts to 
an unconstitutional interference with many organizations' free-
dom of expression and association. 
As with solicitation, the restrictions on group representa-
tion are not only unconstitutional, but they are also inconsistent 
with contemporary legal ethics. Even the leading authority on 
legal ethics can find no rational basis for the prohibition of 
group representation.60 In addition, both the bar61 and the 
courts62 have traditionally allowed group representation of in-
dividuals with common interests. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, OEO views group representation as an integral part of 
Legal Services63 and specifically requires CALS to give it prior-
ity.64 
Thus, by limiting group representation the Appellate Divi-
sion has imposed unconstitutional restrictions. If the court's 
purpose in promulgating these restrictive rules is to prevent 
poor people from becoming the ideological pawns of poverty 
lawyers, the court can assert its traditional disciplinary powers 
over individual attorneys without posing issues of constitutional 
magnitude. 
Coupled with the restrictions on group representation is a 
requirement that poverty law firms refer cases only through 
60 H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 163-64 (1953). 
61 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 111 (1934). The ABA 
has, however, consistently prohibited plans calling for representation of an 
organization's members. E.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 
56 (1931), No.8 (1925). 
62 See, e.g., Royal Oak Drain Dist. v. Keefe, 87 F.2d 786 (6th Cir. 1937); 
Davies v. Stowell, 78 Wis. 334, 47 N.W. 370 (1890). 
63 OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 
6700.35, at 7702 (196S). 
64, OEO's grant to CALS requires that its offices undertake group represen-
tation. OEO, Special Conditions Applicable to CALS and All Delegate and 
Affiliated Corporations § 3.16 (1971) [hereinafter OEO Special Conditions] (on 
file at the New York University Law Review offices). Under the OEO eligibility 
requirements, a Legal Services office may represent nonprofit unincorporated 
associations if the majority of members are poor and if the group as an entity 
does not have the funds required for private representation. Nonprofit corpora-
tions are eligible if the corporation cannot borrow funds and does not have 
sufficient income to pay for private representation, and if most of the members 
are poor and the group's primary goal is to alleviate significant poverty prob-
lems. Such a corporation would also be eligible if "assertion of the particular 
legal principle at issue bears substantial significance to the achievement of justice 
for poor people generally." rd. § 3.1(2)-(3). See also CALS Report, supra 
note 4, at 30-31, which states that a rule preferable to Part 60S, supra note 11, 
§ 60S.7(b), "would be one which makes a group eligible if it lacks money in its 
treasury to hire a lawyer, or if private lawyers have refused to represent the 
group or if the group seeks representation on an issue of wide significance to 
the poor." (emphasis added). 
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conventional channels.65 Any commercial lawyer, of course, is 
very protective of his right to refer-and be referred-cases at 
bar association functions. Poverty lawyers have an even greater 
need for selective referral, however, since some of their clients 
receive unsympathetic treatment from attorneys with conflicting 
ideologies.66 Both Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 'V. Vir-
ginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar67 and United Transportation 
Union 'V. State Bar of Michigan68 recognized this problem and 
upheld systems of highly selective referral; even Mr. Justice 
Harlan, who dissented in Button and subsequent cases, would 
have probably given the system his stamp of approval.69 More-
over, OEO requires merely that Legal Services units "consider" 
using conventional referral systems, but leaves them free to adopt 
their own methods where they feel existing ones are "in-
adequate.'no 
C. Lobbying 
Lobbying is an essential function of the poverty lawyer, 
since it is often a far more effective means of changing the law 
than test cases.71 Legal Services has always emphasized law re-
form as a high-priority component of its overall program,72 and 
naturally, lobbying is an integral part of this commitment. Thus, 
OEO specifically authorizes CALS to engage in law reform, in-
cluding "legislative activities."73 Furthermore, the American 
or; Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(f). 
66 See generally Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 13 (1952). 
67 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
6S 401 U.S. 576 (1971). 
69 See United :Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. DIinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 
217, 228-30 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
70 OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 
6700.35, at 7702 (1968). See also Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 432 
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968). 
71 Salisch, Reform Through Legislative Action: The Poor and the Law, 13 
St. Louis UL.J. 373 (1969). 
72 Reco=endations of Project Advisory Group of Legal Services Program 
on Nat'l Strategy for Law Reform, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 6010, at 7033 
(1968); Memorandum from Earl Johnson, (former) Director, Legal Services 
Program of OEO, to Board of Directors and Staff of Co=unity Action Agencies 
and Legal Services Agencies, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 6010, at 7032 (1968); 
Johnson, Professional Responsibility Aspects of Legal Services Programs, 41 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 319, 324-25 (1969); Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office-
OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services, supra note 49, at 756-57. 
73 OEO Special Conditions, supra note 64, § 4.2 (1971). See also CALS 
Report, supra note 4, at 31, which states that Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(c), 
in prohibiting lobbying and propagandistic activities is "more restrictive than 
current OEO guidelines," even though it allows testimony to be given at legisla-
tive hearings. 
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Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility allows 
lawyers to lobby for their clients.74 
Nevertheless, in its initial CALS decision, the Appellate Divi-
sion opposed lobbying by poverty law firms.75 This dictum sub-
sequently took on concrete form in the rules' prohibition against 
"any political, lobbying, or propagandistic activities" by poverty 
law firms.76 
While the Supreme Court has never squarely held that 
lobbying comes within the first amendment, it has always 
granted lobbying a measure of protection. In both United States 
v. Rumely77 and United States v. Harriss,78 the Court, in order 
to avoid constitutional questions, essentially rewrote federal 
legislation involving lobbying.79 The Court might be less willing 
to go to these lengths today, however, since Harriss relied in 
part on an analogy to criminal libel statutes80-an analogy effec-
tively destroyed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.81 In ad-
dition, the Appellate Division's rules are considerably more 
restrictive than the legislation involved in Rumely and Harriss.82 
74 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-16 (1969). 
75 See note 10 supra. 
76 Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(c). See text accompanying note 85 infra 
for the exception to this prohibition. The rules also prohibit poverty lawyers 
from organizing "protest or civil disobedience groups or social movements." These 
prohibitions apply to attorneys employed by the applicable groups both when 
they act on behalf of the group and when they act on behalf of any other 
person or group. 
77 345 U.S. 41 (1953). Rumely involved a prosecution for contempt of Con-
gress for failure to disclose, pursuant to a resolution, information relating to 
certain "lobbying" activities. 
78 347 U.S. 612 (1954). Harriss involved a prosecution, pursuant to the 
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1964), for failure to 
register as a lobbyist and to disclose lobbying activities and support. By its 
terms, the act applied to anyone paid "to aid . . . (a) The passage or defeat of 
any legislation by the Congress of the United States. (b) To influence, directly 
or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the 
United States." 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1964). 
79 In Rumely, the Court construed "lobbying" to mean "representations 
made directly to the Congress, its members, or its committees." 345 U.S. at 47, 
quoting the lower court opinion, 197 F.2d 166, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In Harriss 
the Court rephrased the test slightly as "direct communication with members 
of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation." 347 U.S. at 620. In 
both cases, the Court said that its construction was necessary to avoid a violation 
of the first amendment. 345 U.S. at 46-47; 347 U.S. at 625-26. 
80 347 U.S. at 626. 
81 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964). Though New York Times involved a civil 
libel action, its principle was, of course, immediately extended to criminal libel 
in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
82 See NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 524-25 (E.D. Va. 1958), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), which 
held unconstitutional a Virginia lobbying registration statute encompassing any-
one who promoted or opposed legislation "in any manner" on the ground that it 
was more restrictive in limiting free speech than the federal statute as inter-
preted in Harriss. 
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They do not merely require the registration of lobbyists and the 
disclosure of their activities, but instead they forbid lobbying 
absolutely.s3 Moreover, in Harriss the Court gave consideration 
to Congress' need to know the sources of "pressures" directed at 
itS4-a need obviously not shared by the Appellate Division. 
Although a proviso to the rules-presumably inserted out 
of deference to Rumely and Harriss-allows poverty lawyers, 
with the permission of the Appellate Division, to "suggest, testify, 
comment on, review and interpret legislation,"85 the permitted 
activity falls far short of the lobbying sanctioned in Rumely and 
Harriss. Upholding the rules' restriction on lobbying would thus 
require judicial surgery far more drastic than that performed 
in Rumely and Harriss. 
Furthermore, by prohibiting lobbying, the Appellate Divi-
sion has prevented poverty lawyers from exercising their right, 
as members of the bar, to criticize the law.86 The Appellate 
Division's fear of lobbying by poverty lawyers is hard to under-
stand, especially since commercial lawyers regard lobbying as 
such an integral part of their profession.87 The potential evils 
of lobbying do not justify a blanket ban, but instead can be 
effectively dealt with through existing state and federallaw.88 
D. Disclosure 
The Appellate Division's rules require a poverty law firm 
to submit an annual report disclosing an extremely broad spec-
trum of information, including its activities,89 the names and 
addresses of all employees,90 and the principal objectives of any 
group represented.91 
The requirement of identifying all employees is the most 
83 In addition, "political and propagandistic" activities are absolutely pro-
scribed. Part 60S, supra note 11, § 60S.7(c) , Cf. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 
227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1955), "mf all address to the public or to authority 
is to be condemned because [it is] propaganda, the right of petition . . . be-
comes meaningless. So, also, with the constitutionally protected right of free 
speech." 
84 347 U.S. at 625. 
85 Part 60S, supra note 11, § 60S.7(c). 
86 In Re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 631 (1959); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 
U.S. 252, 273 (1957). 
87 Cf. County Lawyers Report, supra note 36, at 2. 
88 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 262-70 (1964); cf. N.Y. Election Law § 460 (McKinney 
1970). 
Sll Part 60S, supra note 11, § 6.0S.S(f), 
30 Id. § 60S.8 (c) • 
91 Id. § 60S.S (g). This subsection requires the disclosure of activities in-
Volving "the advocacy or representation of a group of persons in connection with 
social, economic, civil rights, reform or group programs, movements, goals or 
protests," but includes a proviso preserving "the anonymities of the individuals 
involved." 
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objectionable.92 It immediately runs afoul of the cases in which 
the Supreme Court has struck down efforts to obtain NAACP 
membership lists as violative of the rights of free speech and 
free association.93 As the Court is well aware, publicly identify-
ing the members of an unpopular organization not only stigma-
tizes the individuals, but also inhibits the organization's ability 
to attract support.94 Although lawyers are presumably hardier 
than laymen and the bar is supposedly more tolerant than lay 
groups, the young lawyer cannot fail to be influenced by the at-
titudes of his contemporaries. Moreover, law students-often 
employed by poverty law firms-must anticipate their appear-
ance before the Committee on Character and Fitness.95 
Furthermore, the Appellate Division seems to have no real 
need for disclosure. It certainly lacks any of the traditional 
justifications, i.e., possible violence/a Communist infiltration91 
or fraudulent practices.9S Indeed, the court already possesses 
much of the information sought; like all other lawyers, poverty 
lawyers must file notices of appearance and, more importantly, 
must pass the scrutiny of the Committee on Character and Fit-
ness. Thus, the rules create a type of "double admittance" re-
92 Although the required disclosure of the firm's activities certainly seems 
unnecessary and burdensome, see County Lawyers Report, supra note 36, at 4, 
it probably does not present problems of great constitutional magnitude as long 
as it is restricted to requiring fairly general information. Interpreting it more 
expansively to require disclosure of a firm's specific activities, however, would 
run afoul of the same first amendment bans that limit the other disclosure 
provisions. See text accompanying notes 93-102 infra. 
93 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Co=., 372 U.S. 539 
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); cf. 
Louisiana ex re!. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). The ordinance in 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), had a provision very similar to 
§ 608.8(c)'s required disclosure of all attorneys. The ordinance there pro\ided 
that all organizations within the city "list with the City Clerk ••. [t]he officers, 
agents, servants, employees or representatives of such organization, and the 
salaries paid to them." Bates v. Little Rock, supra at 518-19 n.3. A list of those 
paying dues was also required. The Court found that compelling disclosure of 
membership lists was violative of the right of free association. It did not, how-
ever, discuss the required disclosure of officers and employees. It might, of 
course, be argued that these cases are distinguishable from the Appellate Dhision 
requirements in that they involved membership as opposed to employee lists. 
Nevertheless, this appears to be a distinction without significance since an organi-
zation can be straitjacketed by public identification of its employees just as 
well as by public identification of its members. 
94 NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958). 
95 See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 
U.S. 154, 185 (1971) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). 
96 NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1958); New 
York ex reI. Bryant v. Zi=erman, 278 U.S. 63, 75-77 (1928). 
91 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Co=., 372 U.S. 539, 546-48 
(1963). 
9S NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958). 
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quirement, which the Supreme Court recently seems to be 
frowning upon.99 
The rules also require a poverty law firm to submit as part 
of its annual report copies of any publication distributed to 
twenty-five or more persons and a statement of the nature and 
extent of the distribution.loo This requirement is also constitu-
tionally questionable for reasons akin to those applicable to the 
identification provisions. In Talley v. California/ol the Supreme 
Court struck down an ordinance which required that all pam-
phlets identify the publisher. The Court held that such a re-
quirement restricted the freedom to distribute information and 
therefore the freedom of expression.l02 The Appellate Division's 
rule is even more inhibiting since it requires not only disclosure 
of the publisher's identity but also submission of the publication 
to the licensing authority-once again with no guarantee of se-
crecy. The rules, in fact, do not provide for the confidentiality 
of these annual reports. 
E. Equal Protection of Lawyers 
Any self-respecting Wall Street lawyer would, quite natu-
rally, be outraged if suddenly ordered not to represent corpora-
tions, not to refer cases to his friends and, in addition, to give 
the Appellate Division a blow-by-blow description of his inter-
nal office workings. This is, of course, exactly what the 
Appellate Division requires poverty lawyers to do. As articulated 
in the original CALS decision, the court's rationale seems to be 
that the corporate practice of law demands special safeguards.los 
Unfortunately, history has overtaken this traditional analysis. 
New York's Business Corporation Law now permits commer-
ciallaw firms to incorporate, and the Appellate Division has not 
yet subjected these firms to regulation.104, As a result, the Ap-
90 See In Re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 29 (1971). 
100 Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.8(i). 
101 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The Talley principle is, in fact, closely related to 
that of the membership list cases, note 93 supra, as witnessed by the Talley 
Court's citation of Alabama and Bates as analogous cases. Id. at 65. 
102 Id. at 64. 
103 In Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 
2d 354, 356, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (1st Dep't 1966), the court noted that "the 
allowable practice of law by corporations is highly exceptional, permissible only 
in carefully circumscribed conditions consonant with the policy of limiting the 
practice of law to licensed professionals." 
104 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1503(e) (McKinney Supp. 1970) states that "[a] 
corporation authorized to practice law shall be subject to the regulation and 
control of, and its certificate of incorporation shall be subject to suspension, 
revocation or annulment for cause by, the appellate division of the supreme 
court and the court of appeals in the same manner and to the same extent 
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pellate Division's special treatment of poverty law firms now 
can rest only upon the nature of the firms and their clientele. 
Any classification based upon poverty, however, is at least 
"suspect" and perhaps even "forbidden,'Ho5 thus bringing it 
within the equal protection clause. Even if the rules' classifica-
tion is not inherently invalid, it is invidious in its effect, since it 
interferes with poor people's right of access to the courts-a 
right which the Supreme Court has recently begun to rec-
ognize.10G 
In fact, the Fifth Circuit recently applied an equal protec-
tion analysis to a closely related issue. In Trister v. University 
of Mississippi,t°7 the court held that equal protection prohibited 
the university from firing two law professors because of their 
participation in a Legal Services program. If a law school is 
barred from discriminating against poverty lawyers, the Appel-
late Division presumably is also. 
F. Federal Preemption 
The courts might understandably want to avoid either go-
ing into "the business of supervising the practice of law in the 
various statesnl08 or dealing with the far-reaching constitutional 
issues that the Appellate Division's rules raise. However, they 
need not go so far. The courts could invalidate the rules-or at 
least their application to CALS-on the less controversial 
provided in the judiciary law with respect to individual attorneys and counselors-
at-law." The Appellate Division has not exercised the power that this statute 
apparently has given it to regulate corporations authorized to practice law. 
105 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The 
terms are those of Tussman and TenBrock.. See Tussman & TenBrock, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 353-56 (1949). 
106 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.s. 353 (1963); Griffin v. lllinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956). The exact constitutional source of this right is somewhat hazy. 
Initially, the Court seemed to base it upon a conception of equal protection. (In 
Griffin, while the plurality spoke in terms of "[b]oth equal protection and due 
process," id. at 17, the holding must be viewed as based on equal protection 
alone, since Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who cast the deciding vote, spoke solely in 
terms of equal protection. Id. at 21-22. Ten years later, however, the Court 
treated Griffin as having been decided under both provisions. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 
384 U.S. 305 (1966).) More recently the Court again shifted the right of access 
to the courts, this time to the manageable confines of the due process clause. In 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), it was held that a state divorce 
filing fee violated due process by inhibiting access to the courts. \Vhatevcr the 
basis for the right, state action which colorably violates due process is sufficiently 
invidious to violate equal protection. See generally Note, Discriminations 
Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 438 
(1967). 
107 420 F.2d 499, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1969). 
108 United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. lllinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 
234 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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grounds of preemption,l°9 since federal administrative regula-
tions are supreme over state law.110 The Supreme Court has, in 
fact, in an analogous area, indicated that a state may not re-
strict the activities of a federally licensed attorney.1ll 
OEO's general guidelines,1l2 the specific CALS require-
ments1l3 and CALS' explicit authority to supervise its attorneys' 
ethics,114 should thus preempt the Appellate Division's rules. 
The only rub with preemption, however, is simply that OEO has 
never come out and said that it intends to preempt state rules.1l5 
As a result, the courts would have to engage in a bit of judicial 




Mr. Justice Harlan has commented, perhaps by way of 
understatement, that "the organized bar may be thought to have 
been too slow in recognizing" poor people's need for legal ser-
vices.ll7 The remedy, however, is not to be found in the Appel-
late Division's restrictions, despite the court's well-intentioned 
attempts to protect the public.1l8 The poor need protection from 
the private attorneys who make the law a tool of oppression, not 
from the poverty lawyers who are beginning to reverse the bal-
109 Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Con-
struction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208 (1959). The very few privately funded poverty 
law firms would, of course, not receive the benefit of preemption, since OEO's 
policy and rules are not applicable to them. 
110 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 
142 (1963). 
111 In Sperry v. Florida ex ret Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the Court 
stated that a local bar association could not prohibit from practicing patent 
law a nonlawyer practitioner authorized to practice before the Commissioner 
of Patents but not admitted by the state. Accord, Silverman v. State Bar, 405 
F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1968). 
112 OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 
6700.35 (1968). 
113 OEO Special Conditions, supra note 64. 
lH rd. § 2.1. 
115 For a critique of OEO's general failure to lay down clear and affirmative 
guidelines, see Hannon, National Policy Versus Local Control: The Legal Services 
Dilemma,S Calif. WL. Rev. 223 (1969). 
116 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
117 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 599 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., concurring and dissenting). 
118 In Matter of Co=unity Actions for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 
2d 354, 356, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (1st Dep't 1966), the court said that restric-
tions on poverty law firms "are justifiable only as protective of the public • • 
not for the economic preservation of the Bar." 
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ance of legal power. Though there must, of course, be profes-
sional ethics for poverty lawyers, these ethics must reflect 
pragmatic problems-not figments of the judicial imagination.1l9 
Unfortunately, both bench and bar have yet to leave the com-
forts of their marbled halls and face the realities of the street. 
119 The Committee on Legal Aid of the County Lawyers Association some-
what politely noted that it has been "handicapped by a lack of information as 
to the precise nature of the problems faced by the Appellate Division which gave 
rise to the issuance of Part 608." County Lawyers Report, supra note 36, at 5. 
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